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LEGAL STATUS OF THE SPITE FENCE
IN OHIO
JOSEPH OMEARA, JR.
HERMAN W. SANTEN
Of the Cincinnati Bar
It is generally assumed, on the authority of Letts v.
Kessler,' that spite fences in this state are within the
law. That case was decided in 1896 and has never been
overruled. But the world moves on,2 and so does the
law ;3 and no one doubts that courts are daily handing
down decisions that would have been impossible in 1896.
It may not be amiss, therefore, to consider whether the
bar is justified in taking for granted that Letts v. Kessler
would be followed.
HISTORICAL SUMMARY
The history of the law in this country on the question
involved is outlined in a note in the Virginia Law Review,4
from which we quote :'
"It was early established in this country in regard to
154 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765 (1896). The syllabus is as follows: "L and K
owned adjoining lots, and L erected on his lot a board fence reaching to the
roof of K's house which stood on the line of the two lots, which fence shut off
light and air from the windows of the house of K to its injury, which fence was
so erected by L for no useful or ornamental purpose, but from motives of un-
mixed malice toward K. In an action by K against L to compel the removal
of the fence. Held: That L had a legal right to erect and maintain such fence,
and that neither law nor equity could compel its removal."
2"... will anyone venture to say that there is any thing anywhere on this
earth, which will afford a fulcrum for us, whereby to keep the earth from mov-
ing onwards." NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA, 270.
'"Hardly a rule of today but may be matched by its opposite of yesterday."
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss, 26,
411 Va. L. Rev. 122 (1924).
6The cases in brackets are cited in the footnotes to the text quoted.
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spite fences that, apart from statute,6 an action would not
lie therefor. This was laid down as the law in every
jurisdiction, with one exception [Michigan], in which the
case arose during the past century.' As in the case of
spite wells it was held that 'Bad motives in doing an act
which violates no legal right of another, cannot make that
act a ground of action'.8 . ... .
.* ... In .... [Michigan] ... the court had in 1888
taken the bit in its teeth and decided that spite fences
were actionable if malice9 be shown to be the sole motive
for their erection. (Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37
N. W. 838.) .... And although this case was decided by
an evenly divided court, it was subsequently affirmed and
approved by three later decisions in the same jurisdiction.
[Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381; Kirkwood
v. Finegan, 95 Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 457; Peck v. Roe, 110
Mich. 52, 67 N. W. 1080.1
"The Michigan rule stood alone and in direct conflict
with the rule in all other jurisdictions where the case had
arisen. In 1909, however, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in a powerful decision upheld and approved the
reasoning adopted by the Michigan judges and reversed
the holding of the lower court. [ Barger v. Barringer, 151
N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439.1
"This case appears to mark a turning point in the law.
Oln a number of jurisdictions the matter is governed by statute. The cases
arising under these statutes are beyond the scope of this paper. We confine
ourselves to a consideration of the question from the point of view of the
common law.
7InHaverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. St. 368 (1859), a ruling of the trial court pointed
in the direction of the modern cases. The question was not considered by the
Supreme Court.
8It may be observed in passing that, abstractly, this statement is a mere
truism. In practice it either gets us nowhere or begs the question. The issue
in any case is whether a legal right of the plaintiff has been violated. When
that has been determined the case is ended. The second paragraph on page 81
of the opinion in Letts v. Kessler is open to this criticism.
91n this connection, as we understand it, malice means "a malevolcnt motive
for action, without reference to any hope of a remoter benefit to oneself to be
accomplished by the intended harm to another." HOLMSs, COLLHCTOnI LEGAL
PAPERS, 119. Whenever we employ the term in the course of this paper it is
used in that sense.
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In 1912, when the question next arose, the Alabama
court Ifollowed the Michigan and North Carolina cases.
Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 52 So. 283] ....
"Since this case the question has arisen only twice
apart from statute"0 [Hibbard v. Halliday (1916), 58
Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158;11 Daniel v. Birmingham Dental
Mfg. Company (1922), 207 Ala. 659, 93 So. 652]. In both
cases the Michigan rule was followed and approved....
"In view of the fact that for more than twenty years a
right of action has been held to lie in every case of spite
fences arising under the common law, it is submitted that
the weight of modern authority favors the Michigan view
which appears clearly the sounder on principle and natural
justice."
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Since the publication, in 1924, of the article just quoted
from, no case has been decided on the precise point in
question. In two cases1" language has been used indi-
cating an adherence to the obsolescent view that spite
fences may be erected with impunity, but in neither case
was the question before the court for decision, so that
what was said must be classed as dicta.
This, then is the situation: there is not a single decision
in the last twenty-one years supporting the rule of
Letts v. Kessler. Every case in point decided since 190611
is authority for the proposition that a spite fence is
101n Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N. H. 93, 54 Atl. 945 (1903), the plaintiff relied
upon a statute which provided that a fence erected or maintained to annoy the
owners or occupants of adjoining property, should be considered a nuisance.
The question at issue was the constitutionality of this enactment, which was
upheld, so that the plaintiff prevailed. The case is nevertheless important for
our purpose because the court clearly indicated that, in its view, the plaintiff
would have had a right of action even without the statute.
"This holding was foreshadowed by the earlier case of Smith v. Speed, 11
Okla. 95, 66 Pac. 511 (1901).
"Stroup v. Rouschelback, 261 S. W. 346 (Kansas City Ct. of App., Mo., 1924),
Dallas Land 81& Loan Co. v. Garrett, 276 S. W. 471 (Tex. Civ. App., 1925).
'
3Metz v. Tierney, 13 N. Mex. 331 83 Pac. 788 (1906), is the last of the cases
affirming the legality of the spite fence.
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actionable. There is no doubt, therefore, that the weight
of modem authority is against the spite fence.
REASON FOR THE MODERN RULE
The considerations which have led the courts to
abandon the view that a man might build a fence for
no other reason than to injure his neighbor and be pro-
tected by the law in so doing, are well stated by Dean
Pound :14'
"To the nineteenth century way of thinking the
question was simply one of the right of the owner and of
the right of his neighbor. Within his physical boundaries
the dominion of each was complete. So long as he kept
within them and what he did within them was consistent
with an equally absolute dominion of the neighbor within
his boundaries, the law was to keep its hands off. For
the end of law was taken to be a maximum of self-asser-
tion by each, limited onlyby the possibility of a like self-
assertion by all. If, therefore, he built a fence eight feet
high cutting off light and air from his neighbor and
painted the fence on the side toward his neighbor in
stripes of hideous colors, this was consistent with his
neighbor's doing the same; it was an exercise of his
incidental jus utendi, and the mere circumstance that he
did it out of unmixed malice was quite immaterial since it
in no way infringed the liberty or invaded the property
of the neighbor. But suppose we think of law not
negatively as a system of hands off while individuals
assert themselves freely, but positively as a social insti-
tution existing for social ends. Thinking thus, what
claims or demands or wants of society are involved in
such a controversy? There is an individual interest of
substance on the part of each. Each asserts a claim to
use, enjoy and get the benefit of the land of which the law
recognizes him as the owner. Also the one asserts an
individfial interest of personality, a claim to exert his will
"
4POUND, SPIRIT 01' TIlE COMMON LAW, beginning at page 196. See also the
article by Dean Ames, infra, note 20, at page 415, and note 4 on same page.
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and exercise his faculties freely and hence to employ them
in such building operations upon his land as he thinks
proper. What shall society say to these claims? If we
think in terms of social interests and of giving effect to
individual claims to the extent that they coincide with or
may be identified with a social interest, we shall say that
there is a social interest in the security of acquisitions, on
which our economic order rests, and a social interest in
the individual life. But that security of acquisitions is
satisfied by use of property for the satisfaction of wants
of the owner which are consistent with social life; or at
least it is not seriously impaired by so limiting it in order
to give effect to other wants which are consistent with
social life. And the individual life, in which there is a
social interest, is a moral and social life. Hence the
social interest does not extend to exercise of individual
faculties for anti-social purposes of gratifying malice.
The moment we put the matter in terms of social life
rather than of abstract individual will, we come to the
result to which the law has been coming more and more
of late throughout the world."
OHIO CASES
There are, in addition to Letts v. Kessler, two Ohio
reported cases in point, namely, Peck v. Bowman" and
Dawson v. Kemper." The syllabus of the former, de-
cided in 1889 by the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County, is as follows:
"The erection of a high board fence near to the lot line
of the defendant, though entirely on his premises near the
windows of a neighboring house to shut out the view
therefrom, not from necessity, but from malice alone, is a
nuisance; it is an unjustifiable use of one's premises, and
will be enjoined."
In the latter the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton
1510 Ohio Dec. Rep. 567, 22 Wk. L. Bull. Ill (1889).
1632 Wk. I, Bull. 15 (1894).
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County refused to follow Peck v. Bowman, which had
been approved by the Circuit Court in the Letts case.
The trial court was affirmed by the Circuit Court, but
that court expressly found that the defendant had not
acted maliciously.
A careful reading of the opinion in Letts v. Kessler
will show that the court rested its decision on three propo-
sitions, substantially as follows :a'
1. A malicious motive cannot render actionable an
act otherwise not actionable.
2. By the weight of authority a spite fence is not
actionable.
3. The case of Burke v. Smith, having been decided
by a split court, is not an authority.
We shall consider these propositions in order.
1. A malicious motive can not render actionable an
act otherwise not actionable.1 7  Such statements have no
virtue in their own right, but only insofar as they sum-
marize what the courts have held in concrete cases.
The proposition in question is nothing if not a generali-
zation of the decisions in the various classes of cases in
which it has been sought to ground a cause of action
upon malice.18  If it represents the holding in these
cases, or in a substantial majority of them, it is to that
16a.Counsel for the injured party urged the maxim, "Enjoy your own property
in such a manner as not to injure that of another person." The court answered
by saying "that the maxim should be limited to causing injury to the rights of
another, rather than the property of another .... ". There is no basis for any
distinction between "property" and "rights". Property in land is simply the
sum total of the legal rights, privileges, powers and immunities oif the owner
pertaining to the land. See HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
(1923), 28 and 29.
"7The court did not use this phraseology. We think, however, that it fairly
and conveniently expresses what the court said.
18 What follows clearly excludes the possibility that the generalization re-
flects one of those basis postulates which ultimately govern the course of de-
cision.
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extent helpful as eliminating the necessity of recourse
to the cases, which, nevertheless, are themselves the real
authority. If it does not, then it has no place in legal
consideration.
The proposition may, however, be a correct generali-
zation of the decisions in the several classes of cases in
which the effect of malice has been considered, taken as
a whole, and at the same time be utterly untrue as re-
gards one or more of the classes of cases making up the
entire group. In a case belonging to any such class it is ob-
vious that the generalization can not stand against the
authority of the decisions in analogous causes.
Now the modem cases hold that if a plaintiff can show
a fence of which he complains was erected from motives
of unmixed malice, he has a cause of action. It is cer-
tainly no answer to these cases to repeat the generali-
zation we are discussing, in whatever form it may be
expressed.19 If the authority of these cases is to be met,
it must be by recourse to the earlier cases in which the
legality of the spite fence was affirmed.
It is clear then that when the question arises the con-
test will be between the modern precedents on the one
hand and the older precedents on the other. The generali-
zation in question will have no bearing upon the decision,
unless it is believed to state the "general rule", in which
event it might determine the issue against an acceptance
of the modem view.
Is there any basis for the generalization? Dean Ames
considered this question in an article published in 1905.20
l9Reliance upon the generalization, under the circumstances, would suggest
a story that is told of an indigent colored prisoner. The lawyer appointed to
defend him proved sympathetic and, at the conclusion of the darky's account
of what had happened, exclaimed, "Why, they can't put you in jail for that!"
His client readily assented, but pointed out that he was there.
"Ames, How Far an Act May be a Tort because of The Wrongful Motive of the
Actor, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (1905).
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More particularly his inquiry concerned certain state-
ments of the judges in Allen v. Flood,"' of which the fol-
lowing remark of Lord Watson is representative:
"Although the rule may be otherwise with regard to
crimes, the law of England does not, according to my
apprehension, take into account motive as constituting
an element of civil wrong."
This statement Dean Ames "tested by cases in which the
actor in wilfully causing damage to another was domi-
nated by a wrongful motive". His investigation of these
cases led him to the following conclusion:
"If this essay has accomplished its purpose, it is made
clear that the dictum that our law never regards motive
as an element in a civil wrong is as far from the truth as
would be the statement that malevolently to damage
another is always a tort."
The tendency since that article was written may be
summarized in the words of Professor Burdick :22
"There is, however, increasing recognition of the
principle that intentional damage is prima facie tortious
and requires a justification .23 . . . . . . Intentional damage
having been inflicted, the justification is the benefit
intended. Such intended benefit will justify the in-
tended harm. But, where there is no intended benefit,
the harm will be actionable. 24
21(1898) A. C. I.
22BURICK, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed., 1926), sec. 20.
"It is a "commonplace that the intentional infliction of temporal damage...
is actionable if done without just cause." HOLMES, op. cit., supra, note 9,
at p. 119. See also 7 Minn. L. Rev. 600 (1923), note.
2"The gratification of ill-will, being a pleasure, may be called a gain, but the
pain on the other side is a loss more important. Otherwise, why allow a recov-
ery for a battery." HOLMES, op. cit., supra, note 9, at p. 124.
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A conspicuous illustration of this fact is found in
Tuttle v. Buck25 and Dunshee v. Standard Oil Company,26
both of which are authority for the following,27 which
we quote from the opinion in the former case:
"To divert to one's self the customers of a business
rival by the offer of goods at lower prices is in general a
legitimate mode of serving one's own interest, and justi-
fiable as fair competition. But when a man starts an
opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit to
himself, and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor
out of business, and with the intention of himself retiring
upon the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he
is guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort."
Another striking case is American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Federal Reserve Bank.28 The plaintiffs complained
that the defendant had determined to accumulate checks
drawn upon them and present the checks for payment all
at one time, which would seriously embarrass the plain-
tiffs, if not drive them out of business. The bill, which
sought an injunction, contained allegations to the effect
that the defendant's proposed course of action was in
the nature of a reprisal against the plaintiffs for not
becoming members of the federal reserve system. The
defendant contended that the holder of a check has a
right to present it to the drawee bank for payment over
the counter and that however many checks he may hold
he has the same right as to all and may present them all
at once, whatever his motive or intent. The court held
that the bill stated a cause for an injunction and reversed
the decree dismissing it for want of equity.
We do not know of any attempt to tabulate the various
23 10 7 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909).
" 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911).
2'TCompare AMES, op. cit., supra, note 20, at p. 420.
28256 U. S. 350 (1921).
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types of cases in which the legal significance of a malicious
motive has been passed upon, and, by separating those
in which the plaintiff was allowed a recovery on that
ground from those in which judgment was for the defend-
ant, to strike a mathematical balance. Nor do we pro-
pose to enter upon any such undertaking, which, as we
see it, would serve no useful purpose, for the reasons
mentioned in the next paragraph. This much, however,
is certain, namely, that there are many classes of cases
in which a recovery is allowed on the sole ground that
the defendant acted maliciously. 9 That is enough to
establish the invalidity and misleading character of the
generalization under discussion.29
It is objectionable for another reason. A generaliza-
tion, if it serves any purpose, does no more than obviate
the necessity of going back to the cases. Obviously, if
cases are not analogous one to another, nothing but
confusion can result from generalizing them. Now the
various classes of cases involving the legal effect of malice
differ widely from each other, not only as regards the
facts but also as regards the interests affected and the
considerations involved, and, therefore, do not admit of
measurement by the same yardstick. To illustrate: A
creditor pursues his debtor with all the rigor of the law
in order to ruin him, knowing that, with some indulgence,
he would realize more himself and enable his debtor to
avoid bankruptcy. The malicious motive of the creditor
is legally of no significance. The debtor is legally bound
"See Ames, op. cit., supra, note 20, pp. 416 to 420, inclusive; 62 I,. l . A. 673,
note; Houston v. Laffee, 46 N. H. 505 (1866); Medford v. Levy, 31VW. Va. 649,
8 S. E. 302 (1888); Tuttle v. Buck, supra, note 25; Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co.,
supra, note 24; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra,
note 28; Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203 (1923) :ind cases
cited; 11 Va. L. Rev., 122, 124 (1926).
9ain many of the cases containing language which supports the gciierali-
zation, the act complained of was not motivated solely by malice. The. deci-
sions in these cases, therefore, are not pertinent to our inquiry.
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to pay and can not claim damages for being brought into
court on account of his breach of duty." Now take this
case: a passenger on a street car, having been subjected
to outrageous treatment by the conductor, reports the
latter's misconduct. The fact that, in so doing, he grati-
fies a desire for revenge, born of his humiliation, does not
make him a tort-feasor.3 ' Obviously these cases have
nothing in common and the holding in the first could not
with any show of reason be cited as an authority for the
second. Both decisions rest on grounds of policy,32 but
the grounds are not the same. There is, accordingly, no
room for a generalization of the cases in which the legal
significance of malice has been passed upon.
It follows that there is no "general rule" that could
logically be relied upon to give aid and comfort to the
older spite fence cases.
Our Supreme Court has already indicated that it
would not be fettered by the generalization we have
been considering. In Jaeger v. Topper,33 the court said:
"It is familiar law that every man is permitted to do
what he will with his own property if he uses it without
purpose to injure his neighbor, ....... " (Italics ours).
A more important case is American Mortgage Company
v. Rosenbaum.4 Rosenbaum, a stockholder in the mortgage
company, had demanded that he be permitted to make
an examination of the books and papers of the corporation.
Meeting with refusal, he sought a mandatory injunction
30Ames, op. cit., supra, note 20, at p. 413.
"Lancaster v. Hamburger, 70 Ohio St. 156 (1904).
....., in all such cases the ground of decision is policy; and the advantages
to the community, on the one side and the other, are the only matters really
entitled to be weighed." HOLMES, op. cit., supra, note 9, at p. 130; Ames, op.
cit., supra, note 20, p. 414.
U 1 0 3 Ohio St. 350, 359, 133 N. E. 82 (1921).
34114 Ohio St. 231, 151 N. E. 122 (1926).
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against the company, relying upon section 8673 of the
General Code, which then provided in part:
The books and- records of such corporation at all
reasonable times shall be open to the inspection of every
stockholder.
The company took the position that Rosenbaum sought
the information which the books and papers would dis-
close, in bad faith and in order to make a personal profit
at the expense of the corporation, and that, therefore,
he was not entitled to it. Rosenbaum contended that
the statute gave him an absolute legal right and that
his motive in exercising that right was immaterial, citing
Cincinnati Volksblatt Company v. Hoffmeister, in
which the court-said:
"Ordinarily the motive, or purpose, of the party who is
in the exercise of, or is about to exercise, a clear legal
right, is unimportant. Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St., 73,
and authorities cited; ....... A like rule prevails as
to one's pursuit of an equitable remedy."
The court, in effect, overruled the statements just quoted,
which it classed as dicta, and held that Rosenbaum was
not entitled to the relief sought, on the ground that he
was actuated by improper motives.86
It will be noted that the language of the statute is
absolute and unconditional. There would seem to be no
way, however, in which a stockholder can compel com-
pliance therewith, except through the processes of equity.
But the court held that equity will not intervene if the
stockholder is actuated by improper motives. An un-
"562 Ohio St. 189, 56 N. U. 1033 (1900).
"The case was decided on demurrer to the answer. Hence the actual state
of mind of Mr. Rosenbaum was not passed upon.
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enforceable legal right is a contradiction in terms. 7 The
very existence of the right to inspect is, therefore, made
to depend upon the motive of the stockholder. This is a
clear repudiation of the generalization we have been dis-
cussing.
2. By the weight of authority spite fences are not ac-
tionable. That this is no longer true is clearly shown by
the authorities we have already cited.
3. The case of Burke v. Smith, having been decided
by a split court, is not an authority. As to this it need be
said only that the question has three times been raised
in the Supreme Court of Michigan since Burke v. Smith,
and that each time the court has unanimously followed
its decision in that case. 8
The decision in Letts v. Kessler is, therefore, left with-
out a base. But cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. The
'TSee HOLMUS, op. cit., supra, note 9 (p. 168), "One of the many evil effects
of the confusion between legal and moral ideas ....... is that theory is apt to
get the cart before the horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something
existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to which
certain sanctions are added afterward. But ... a legal duty, so called, is
nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be
made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a legal
right ....... (p. 170). I do not say that there is not a wider point of view
from which the distinction between law and morals becomes of secondary or no
importance, as all mathematical distinctions vanish in the presence of the
infinite ........ (p. 171). If you want to know the law and nothing else,
you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanc-
tions of conscience. . . . (p. 313) ... for legal purposes a right is only the
hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact
that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to
contravene it-just as we talk of the force of gravitation accounting for the
conduct of bodies in space. . . . (p. 173). The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
aaFlaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381 (1890); Kirkwood v. Finegan,
95 Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 457 (1893); Peck v. Roe, 110 Mich. 52, 67 N. W. 1080
(1896).
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court is accordingly free to consider the question at
issue upon its merits and to adopt the modem rule,
which is the rule that originally prevailed in this state.
We submit that it should do so-"There is no general
policy in favor of allowing a man to do harm to his neigh-
bor for the sole pleasure of doing harm." 9
39HOLMES, op. cit., supra, note 9, at p. 124.
